The left-wing populist and former Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva is a heavy favorite to return to power in his country’s October presidential elections. If he can hold the lead he currently has in the polls, his victory will put the six largest economies in Latin America—Argentina, Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Peru, and now Brazil—under the control of left-wing populists. But those already in office in these countries are seeing dramatic declines in their approval ratings, with the exception of Mexico’s President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, whose favorability has dropped only modestly this year. Street protests have broken out against Argentina’s President Alberto Fernández, and Peru’s legislature has twice tried to impeach President Pedro Castillo. Voters in Chile seem certain to reject a new constitution that was the centerpiece of President Gabriel Boric’s election campaign. What’s happened here?
Javier Corrales is the chair of the Political Science Department at Amherst College and the author of five books on Latin America. As Corrales explains it, the Latin American leftists now in power came to it through widespread voter disappointment with the right-wing leaderships preceding them—and are now the objects of such disappointment themselves. While some external causes are contributing to the pattern, particularly with inflation topping 10 percent across much of the region, Corrales says, the new left-wing leaderships’ loss of support is also from serious mistakes they’ve made themselves—often as the result of a shared tendency toward authoritarian populism. Lula and all five of Latin America’s current left-wing populist presidents regularly use polarizing rhetoric that drives away many citizens, and they frequently use political tactics that undermine their countries’ democratic institutions.
Michael Bluhm: Why have leftists been winning elections throughout Latin America?
Javier Corrales: The region has experienced very strong anti-incumbent sentiment for a couple of decades now. The good news is that most countries here have political systems that allow anti-incumbent sentiment to produce political change. It swings from left to right—the current crop of left-wing ruling parties succeeded right-wingers—but the constant is that ruling parties become unpopular, get defeated, and new parties come in. Which is a victory for democracy.
The bad news, though, is that there’s still so much discontent and anti-incumbent sentiment. I’d highlight two factors. The first is about the state: Latin American states are tremendously underfunded. Their capacity to collect taxes is underdeveloped, and the tax base is not very wealthy. They don’t generate tax large revenues, so the administrative capacity of the state is very weak. As a result, democratically elected governments have state apparatuses that can’t deliver services. They have a chronic inability to meet important goals the public expects them to meet: education, infrastructure, healthcare, and security. This is a big problem that isn’t easy to address. Colombia and Chile, for example, are struggling with it, but there aren’t many opportunities to generate new revenues.
The second factor helps explain why the left is so prevalent now, despite not having a great historical record: The region has very high levels of economic inequality. It’s the first thing that many people think about when they think of Latin America. Leftist, populist politics dominate in societies where there’s a lot of inequality, because there’s a mass of people attracted by political rhetoric that promises redistribution and help for the poor. That kind of rhetoric has appealed across democracies down through time, since ancient Greece.
Bluhm: You mention anti-incumbent sentiment. How much of the success of leftist candidates is just due to citizens wanting to vote out the parties who were in office?
Corrales: There’s some of that dynamic, but every time the left or right returns to power, it comes transformed into something new. Chilean President Gabriel Boric, for example, presented his politics as representing an updated left—a younger left, much more oriented around identity issues. In Colombia, incoming President Gustavo Petro chose a very non-traditional vice-presidential candidate: a woman of African descent who’s an environmentalist. It’s a way to say, We’re a new left—not the old left of Marxist economics.
Leftist, populist politics dominate in societies where there’s a lot of inequality, because there’s a mass of people attracted by political rhetoric that promises redistribution and help for the poor. That kind of rhetoric has appealed across democracies down through time, since ancient Greece.
So it’s not entirely cyclical, but there’s a swing between left and right. Political differences in Latin America remain rooted in ideas of the left and the right, so the menu of parties continues to be arrayed between left and right. But every time one of these two poles returns to power, it comes with an updated discourse and outward appearance.
Bluhm: Authoritarian populism has been on the rise globally for some years now, and Latin America has a history of this kind of anti-democratic style. How much of a tendency toward authoritarian populism do you see in today’s leftist leaders?
Corrales: The essence of liberal democracy is its limits on the executive branch. Many presidents would like to supersede those limits, and this temptation is pervasive in the region. If a system is to stop authoritarian moves, either the presidents will have a personal belief in the value of checks and balances, or the system has to block them directly. To advance authoritarian moves, presidents need the institutional capacity to go forward with them.
But to answer your question, I’d look at a particular country’s set of institutions. Do those institutions convey to the president, Don’t go there, or you’re going to run into trouble? Some countries offer more serious roadblocks than others; there’s a lot of variation.
Instead of focusing on whether some leftist movement has authoritarian characteristics—because there’s always this temptation—we need to focus on whether the system has the ability to contain authoritarianism.
Bluhm: Amy Erica Smith has said that the authoritarian populism of leftists is distinct from the right-wing populism of Donald Trump, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, or Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro. Left-wing populism, she says, taps into popular anger against wealthy elites, foreign and domestic. How do you see the populism of these leftists?
Corrales: The common denominator is that all populist movements think of themselves as representing the people against elites. This is very undemocratic, because one group does not represent all the people in a democracy. The people is actually divided into a plurality of interests, and groups represent parts of those interests; that’s why we call them parties.
I agree with Amy Erica Smith that the left in Latin America sees the people as low-income folks and elites as those associated with capitalism. The right will talk about the people as traditional folks, or as those who aren’t interested in experimenting culturally, and elites as those who represent institutions with privileged status—corporations or universities or institutions associated with technical expertise, for example.
Instead of focusing on whether some leftist movement has authoritarian characteristics—because there’s always this temptation—we need to focus on whether the system has the ability to contain authoritarianism.
Bluhm: There’s variation among these leftist leaders. Some are more populist than others or offer different economic policies, for example. How do you understand these leaders’ similarities and differences?
Corrales: Leftist movements promise high levels of government spending and redistribution, so in Latin America, they all end up promoting the one economic activity that produces significant revenue in the region: extracting and exporting natural resources.
Countries need to get revenue from somewhere, but the states of Latin America are underfunded. Even a mild leftist populist like López Obrador in Mexico has turned enormous attention to the idea of re-nationalizing the oil sector and extracting resources.
What differentiates these leftist leaders from one another is the extent to which they go after existing institutions—or alternatively, the extent to which they respect the rules of the game and the system of checks and balances.
Some populists really go after institutions, attacking them publicly, including on Twitter, or through policy. They try to turn them into partisan bodies—to undermine their autonomy and either destroy them or transform them into organs of the executive branch.
That’s where you see a significant variation in outcomes. If a president succeeds in undermining three groups—the courts, the private press, and electoral institutions—then authoritarianism is almost inevitable. But if they stop short of that, then the system stays less authoritarian.
Bluhm: These countries are all experiencing the high inflation common worldwide at the moment. How much does Latin American voters’ increasing disapproval of their leftist leaders reflect an unhappiness with the economy?
Corrales: Since 2015, the region has been in an economic slowdown—and in some cases, like Argentina, a recession. The pandemic made it even worse. Latin American countries had started to recover, but now they’re being hit by two external shocks: rising interest rates in the United States and rising energy costs around the world, which are acutely affecting countries that don’t export energy resources.
All governments in Latin America are dealing with a very adverse economic environment, which seriously complicates their ability to deliver for their constituents. So all these governments are going to be experiencing declining approval ratings.
Bluhm: Beyond the economic problems, the region’s leftist leaders haven’t really been able to keep many of the pledges they made in their campaigns, especially pledges about programs for the poor and farmers. How much of these leaders’ unpopularity is on account of their performance?
Corrales: It varies from case to case—of course, not being able to deliver what they promised produces significant discontent.
But why are they still unable to win over more independent folks? There’s something about these presidents that’s very unappealing to groups on the other side. It’s not just their leftism; it’s the way that they conduct politics—it feels very threatening to their opponents.
There’s something about these presidents that’s very unappealing to groups on the other side. It’s not just their leftism; it’s the way that they conduct politics—it feels very threatening to their opponents.
And there’s a big element of incompetence here—either they’re just not good at their job or their administration flounders as a team. There’s a new paper by a great political scientist, Kurt Weyland, who argues that populism tends to lead to terrible mistakes in office. He argues that if you had a system of checks and balances and greater pluralism, many mistakes could be prevented. But with unchecked populism, stupidity doesn’t get stopped, so you end up with a lot of blunders. As an example, President Pedro Castillo in Peru has been repeatedly nominating corrupt and inept people for public office. The press immediately discovers all sorts of scandals, and the officials have to resign.
So it’s a combination—of not being able to deliver what they promise and crashing because of mistakes of their own.
Bluhm: I thought you might give the example of Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro’s shambolic response to the coronavirus pandemic.
Corrales: That would have been a good example. These presidents made so many mistakes, and there’s a logic to it. When you don’t respect the system of checks and balances, and when you always want to go against the advice of experts, you’re going to make mistakes, because these systems of checks and balances exist precisely to block crazy policies. Presidents who defy these institutions will make big blunders. In Brazil, the blunders with the pandemic are among the most important reasons why Bolsonaro’s approval ratings absolutely plummeted.
Bluhm: How much support for populism remains in Latin America?
Corrales: It’s very interesting that both the demand for and the rejection of populism are high in Latin America these days. It’s a little like the United States.
The numbers of people still eager to fall in love with populism on the left or the right are strong and growing. But Latin America is also a region with important leaders of political movements that are very much on guard against populism and ready to block it.
Since the 1930s, populism has been an important attribute of Latin American politics, and one could even say that Latin America popularized populism. But populism is now meeting its match. Everywhere where a populist comes into office, they face significant resistance. That’s very different from the 1990s and 2000s, when leftist populists such as Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez came in and overwhelmed the opposition. Not anymore.
Bluhm: When you say that Latin America popularized populism, what leaders do you have in mind?
Corrales: Eva and Juan Domingo Perón from 1940s Argentina are very well-known. By the 1930s and ‘40s, you see early versions of present-day populism—typically on the left, though also some elements of right-wing populism—in Brazil and in Mexico with Lázaro Cárdenas, who was president from 1934 to 1940.
The numbers of people still eager to fall in love with populism on the left or the right are strong and growing. But Latin America is also a region with important leaders of political movements that are very much on guard against populism and ready to block it.
In the 1930s, many Latin American countries began to experiment with the idea that an alternative to military rule is a form of democracy—not liberal democracy, but one where a strongman calls the shots. It still has regular elections and institutions that appear democratic—and maybe even grants some rights to citizens—but it grants far more power to the president than to anyone else.
This idea was gaining strength in Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico. There were other examples, such as Venezuela. These earlier versions are like “Populism 1.0,” and you can still see traces of left-wing and right-wing populism from the ‘30s and ‘40s in Latin America today.
Bluhm: You’ve said a couple of times that Latin America has historically tended toward left-wing populism. Is some of that rooted in lingering resentment against the United States and other former colonial powers?
Corrales: Absolutely. Populism very easily transforms into a hyper-nationalist, anti-international movement on the right. But in Latin America, where left-wing populism was more dominant until the 2010s, it also comes with very strong anti-Americanism, anti-imperialism, and anti-capitalism, which appeals even to intellectual elites and educated groups.
This is where anti-colonial struggles meet populism. It develops into, We are in favor of helping the poor. That means fighting economic elites, so we need to fight imperialism, which is the ally of economic elites in our countries.
That’s why populism is very divisive in the region—not everyone in Latin America thinks that the United States is the region’s number-one public enemy.
Bluhm: Why are people in Latin America so unhappy with the leftists they’ve been electing?
Corrales: One, some of the structural conditions that produced this wave have not been addressed. Two, many of the newly elected presidents engage in political practices that are very appealing to their supporters but very unappealing to other groups—so they polarize voters.
You get this combination of economic conditions that make it very difficult for any president to deliver on their promises, but they also use very polarizing strategies that aren’t designed to create harmony in their countries; they’re designed to make opponents feel more antagonized.