After months of petitioning from Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Germany and the U.S. announced on Wednesday, January 25, that they’d initiated sending advanced battle tanks to Kyiv. Zelenskyy had first asked for tanks more than half a year ago—300 of them. The number now on their way from Western allies is less than 20 percent of that. Germany’s Leopard 2s will take months to deliver, more tanks from other European allies could arrive in the months to follow, and American M1 Abramses might not see their way to Ukraine for a year. What difference could these weapons systems make to the outcome of the war—and why is the West delivering so few, so long after Ukraine asked for them?
Robert Hamilton is a research professor at the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute, a retired colonel and 30-year veteran of the U.S. Army, and an analyst on conflict and security issues in the former Soviet Union and the Balkans. It took a while, Hamilton says, for Ukraine’s allies to believe it could resist the Russian invasion for long enough to get complex weapons like tanks to them, let alone to train them up. If the Ukrainians couldn’t use these weapons effectively, after all, they’d not just get them destroyed but potentially let them fall into the Russians’ hands. Western confidence in the wisdom of arming Ukraine has since grown considerably, Hamilton says—but the practicalities, including the politics, of doing it have remained tricky.
Eve Valentine: NATO and Western countries had refused to send tanks for months. Why are they agreeing to now?
Robert Hamilton: At the outset of the war, there was a lot of concern across the West about the risk of escalation between Russia and Ukraine. Of course, Russia helped provoked that by labeling any assistance to Ukraine as escalatory and destabilizing.
But as Russia pressed on, and as Ukraine increasingly demonstrated its ability to defend itself—and even to reverse some of Russia’s territorial gains—we’ve seen an increasing willingness among Western governments to accept more risk. And with that, we’ve seen an increasing willingness to provide more complex and capable weapons systems that take longer to learn how to use and that require more logistical support.
After the initial invasion, many Western governments fell into the unfortunate assumption that what came next would be a short war—that Russia would roll Ukraine—and this assumption stalled their eventual support efforts. Ukraine ended up surprising the world, not only with the tenacity of its resistance but with the competence of its defense. And frankly, Russia ended up surprising even itself with the incompetence of its offense.
As the war’s gone on—and I think the perspective now among most Western governments is that it’ll be with us for a long time—Western countries have shown greater confidence in Ukraine and, with that, a greater openness to investing in military support for it.
Valentine: Looking at European allies specifically, EU countries other than Germany have been relatively eager to send Leopard tanks to Ukraine—and have been pushing Berlin to let them do it. Why has Germany been so hesitant to send Leopards—or allow other EU countries to send them?
Hamilton: There’s a very deep-seated historical aversion in German foreign policy and in German national-security policy to doing anything unilaterally. That’s for obvious and good historical reasons, going back to World War II. Germany today never wants to strike out on its own. It always wants to act as part of an alliance—as part of a coalition. And when it comes to the war in Ukraine, and any NATO effort behind it, the most important ally and coalition partner for Germany is the United States.
So it was important to the Germans that the U.S. would lead the effort to supply tanks—or at least that the two countries would co-lead this effort. Germany’s Chancellor Olaf Scholz made this quite clear: His country would not move on delivering tanks unless and until the United States provided some of its own. That would be an absolute condition for the Germans to send even the relatively small number of 14 Leopard 2s they’ve now agreed to send.
Germany today never wants to strike out on its own. It always wants to act as part of an alliance—as part of a coalition. And when it comes to the war in Ukraine, and any NATO effort behind it, the most important ally and coalition partner for Germany is the United States.
It’s true, meanwhile, that Germany wasn’t only hesitant to send Leopards; it was hesitant to allow other countries to send them. That’s because Leopards are German tanks. Germany isn’t alone in requiring permission for transferring weapons systems it develops to third countries. The United States does exactly the same thing. We call it third-party transfer authority. If a country buys a U.S. weapon, and that country wants to sell it in turn, the U.S. has to approve the transfer. So in that sense, there’s nothing unusual about Germany’s requirements.
Valentine: Ukraine asked for a lot more than that—300. Germany, as you mention, is going to send 14, and other Western nations will send several more. Why so few all around?
Hamilton: The actual numbers I’m seeing are 31 M1 Abrams tanks from the U.S., 14 Leopards from Germany, 14 Challengers from the U.K., and then some more Leopards from Poland too—I haven’t heard a number there. I understand the French are considering sending some of their Leclerc tanks, meanwhile.
So the commitment we know of is 59 tanks. And as the Ukrainians structure their tank units, that’s only a couple of battalions—not enough to change the course of the war.
As a platform, the tank is the premier offensive ground maneuver weapon in the world. Enough of them, used correctly, could potentially change the course of the war. But two battalions of tanks won’t do that on their own. Whether the number that would is 300 or 200 or 150, it’s definitely more than 59.
That said, I don’t expect this is the last we’ll see of Western tanks being supplied to Ukraine—if the Ukrainians show they can use the tanks well, even in the small numbers they’ve been supplied in. Then, I think, Western governments will be open to supplying them in greater numbers.
As a platform, the tank is the premier offensive ground maneuver weapon in the world. Enough of them, used correctly, could potentially change the course of the war. But two battalions of tanks won’t do that on their own.
Valentine: If this batch of tanks won’t change the course of the war, what difference do you think they’ll make?
Hamilton: Let’s start with the U.S. number of 31—we didn't pull that number out of thin air. In almost all post-Soviet countries, that is the number of tanks in a battalion: There are three companies, each has 10 tanks, and then the battalion commander has a tank.
Then let’s look at the 14 each from the U.K. and Germany—that’s the size of a NATO tank company. So it appears the U.S. has decided to transfer what would essentially be a Ukrainian battalion, and the U.K. and Germany have decided to transfer one company each.
If the Ukrainians organize these tanks into an Abrams battalion and a Leopard battalion, deploy them in a focused way—in one sector of their defensive lines, likely in the East or the South—and use them properly there, they could exploit a breakthrough.
Valentine: How so?
Hamilton: In offensive warfare, tanks are very, very good to have when your enemy has prepared defensive lines—with mines or other obstacles—and you’re able to hit those defensive lines with artillery and breach them with infantry. The tanks can then go through the breach and exploit it very quickly, flanking the enemy or moving in behind it.
So if the Ukrainians use the tanks in that way, and use them well, they could make a real difference along some extent of the lines where they’re now faced off against the Russians in the East and South.
What you certainly don’t want to do is sprinkle 59 tanks all over the battlefield, because when they’re used that way, they’re not remotely as effective. They need to operate at least at the level of a company, and preferably at the level of a battalion, to help create and exploit a real breakthrough in the Russian lines.
Valentine: Back in the U.S., Colin Kahl, third in command at the Pentagon, has said it makes no sense to send M1 Abrams tanks to Ukraine—that it would be logistically very difficult to train Ukrainians to use them or to maintain and repair them. Also, these tanks likely won’t arrive for a year. So what difference will Abrams tanks make on the battlefield?
Hamilton: It’s a good question. First of all, most of the European allies—other than the U.K. and France—use the Leopard 2. So if a lot of NATO allies signed up for supplying tanks, you could end up having a lot of Leopard 2s in Ukraine.
What you certainly don’t want to do is sprinkle 59 tanks all over the battlefield, because when they’re used that way, they’re not remotely as effective. They need to operate at least at the level of a company, and preferably at the level of a battalion, to help create and exploit a real breakthrough in the Russian lines.
What that means, logistically, is that—when it comes to ammunition, fuel, spare parts, all these other things—mechanics and others maintaining the tanks will have to be trained on the Leopard, its engine, its fire-control system, the turret, the suspension, and so on. There are a lot of Leopards in Europe that could potentially be sent to Ukraine—and the more tanks you have of one type, the better off you are.
In that sense, the criticism of the U.S. sending M1s isn’t entirely invalid. The M1 is a very different tank. All the other tanks we’re talking about—the Leopard, the Challenger, the Leclerc—have diesel engines. The M1 has a gas-turbine engine; it’s a different type of engine. The M1 can run on diesel, but the U.S. normally operates it on what we call JP8, which is essentially kerosene. The engine can run almost any fuel out there—kerosene, diesel, or jet fuel—but when you change fuels, you have to change all the filters on the tank, and that’s a really time- and labor-intensive process. So the M1 is a very complex tank, and it’s going to be a little more difficult to support logistically.
But the latest model M1s are extremely capable tanks. Now, it’s unlikely that the U.S. would send the absolute latest-model M1s to Ukraine, just because of the danger of the technology being captured. But even the M1A2—the latest model that’s approved for export—is an extremely capable tank. So the question you have to ask is, is the enhanced or increased capability of the M1 worth the extra logistical complexity and effort?
Valentine: And I take it you consider that an open question?
Hamilton: I do. I don’t have a strong opinion on that. In a perfect world, perhaps the Ukrainians would get 300 of the most advanced versions of the Leopard 2 that their European allies could cobble together. Then you’d have one logistical-support effort, because you’d have one type of tank, and the U.S. would find some way to compensate its European allies. But that’s not the world we operate in.
Again, the Germans were never going to send Leopards unless and until the U.S. was with them shoulder-to-shoulder with its own tanks. That’s why you’ll have at least two different types of tanks in Ukraine.
Valentine: You mention that this is still going to be a long war. And we’re talking about tanks and the difference they might make to its outcome over time. How do you see the current status on the battlefield?
Hamilton: I’d describe the status on the ground now as a kind of grinding attritional stalemate. The Ukrainians made some really impressive gains in the North and in the South during the fall. And then, when the rains came, the ground got really mucky and it was hard to maneuver off-road—and when that happened, things slowed down for them a bit.
There are a lot of Leopards in Europe that could potentially be sent to Ukraine—and the more tanks you have of one type, the better off you are.
They’re meanwhile saying pretty consistently—and I’m hearing this from other credible sources—that the Russians are going to mount some sort of counteroffensive this winter. But even with their 200,000-to-300,000-person partial mobilization, they’ve lost so many armored vehicles, so many armored personnel carriers, tanks—so many offensive-maneuver platforms, as they’re called—that you could put all these additional people on the battlefield, and I just don’t know that you’d have any offensive-maneuver platforms for them to be on. And even if you did, you’d still have to train them; you’d still have to organize them into units; they’d still have to be led by competent leadership. And these are all things the Russians are struggling with.
Valentine: In recent days, Zelenskyy has followed up on this conversation with a request for F-16 fighter jets. What difference would they make—and why have the U.S., Germany, and their allies so unambiguously rejected the idea?
Hamilton: The Russian Air Force isn’t doing much flying over Ukraine. Most of the ballistic-missile strikes are long-range, air to ground, from bombers flying in Russian airspace or, for example, over the Caspian Sea. So there doesn’t seem to be much of a case for bringing in fighter jets for an air-to-air role. In an air-to-ground role, however, they could be very useful. One of the key purposes of the F-16 for the U.S. Air Force is what we call close air support: It attacks targets on the ground from the air, and it’s very good at that.
Now, if we go back to the beginning of the war and recall how short Ukraine’s Western allies expected the whole thing to be, again, it didn’t make sense to them to provide the Ukrainians with complex advanced weaponry of any kind that requires a long time to train up on—and also for which delivery times are in the weeks or months, not days—because the war might well have been over by the time any of it gets there. Now we’re sending tanks, because now it makes sense to tackle the logistical challenges of using them. And yet when we consider those logistical challenges, F-16s are on another planet—in terms of maintenance and support and the capabilities it takes to keep those things flying.
Valentine: I imagine Zelenskyy would know this, so why is he asking?
Hamilton: Zelenskyy is a communicator. His whole career has been about communication, whether as an actor or a comedian or a politician or whatever. And he’s very effective at it. He understands, now is a good time to bring the question of fighter jets into the public sphere—to put it out there. The discussion will likely continue for months. And then, in the U.S., there’ll be a bunch of National Security Council meetings about it, and we’ll talk to our allies, and it may be that we decide to send F-16s—or never to send them or any fixed-wing aircraft at all.
My sense is, the U.S. and its allies are going to kick this can down the road as long as they can—until it were to become clear that Ukraine couldn’t win without these aircraft. And I don’t think that’s at all clear at this point. We’re more apt to let the tanks get there, and we’ll see what they can do.