The enemy of my enemy is still my enemy

In the early morning of June 13, Israel struck a number of buildings in Iran’s capital, Tehran. It was initially unclear what would happen next, but after establishing aerial supremacy, Israel then launched a comprehensive bombing campaign, hitting targets throughout the country. Iran responded by firing hundreds of missiles back toward Israel, killing some 28 people. Tehran claims Israel’s strikes killed at least 1,060 people in Iran. A week later, after the smoke had cleared, the United States then sent its B-2 stealth bombers with the intent to inflict, in U.S. President Donald Trump’s words, “monumental damage” on Iranian nuclear facilities. 

Inside Iran, the regime was humiliated: Its top nuclear scientists had been killed along with many key military officers, as had many ordinary Iranians. A regime that had invested a lot of its prestige in the idea of leading an “Axis of Resistance” now seemed incapable of putting up much resistance when it really mattered. Still, the Israeli and American strikes appear to have triggered a rally-‘round-the-flag effect, with Iranians still overwhelmingly critical of the regime but supportive of Iran in its regional conflict.

As an illustration, former Deputy Interior Minister Mostafa Tajzadeh, now an enemy of the state, relayed a message from prison, stating, “To support a foreign military attack ordered by someone indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal Court [Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu] is politically and morally indefensible. Even if this war were to bring down the failing religious regime, it would leave Iran in ruins, most likely descending into anarchy and chaos.” 

What’s happening in Iran?

Trita Parsi is the executive vice president of the Quincy Institute. Parsi says the Iranian regime has lost the support of the Iranian people comprehensively. Only a very small segment of the population now backs the Islamic Republic. And yet the recent strikes have mitigated the conflict, if not bridged the gap, between the Iranian government and the Iranian people—to the point, Parsi says, that the same Iranians who’ve come to hate their rulers are starting to become receptive to their narrative that “resistance” to the West is necessary, because the West fundamentally can’t be trusted. Still, Parsi says, even though Iranians seem to have become more sympathetic to the regime’s view of the West, there’s no evidence that they’ve become sympathetic to the regime itself.

Possibly to the contrary: Because the regime is so thoroughly unpopular, even Iranians who’ve accepted its negative assessment of the West are, en masse, criticizing the regime for leaving Iran vulnerable to attack by it. The “Axis of Resistance” melted quickly in the fire of Israeli bombardment, they say—what a terrible investment. How could Tehran spend so much money propping up a a “resistance” that would prove so weak? The regime seems to appreciate the point, so it’s now frantically trying to rally public support behind the one thing that’s actually worked in this whole mess: their missile program … 

Gustav Jönsson: Before the recent round of fighting, where was Iranian public opinion on the Islamic Republic?