‘A huge, flying conflict of interest’

On September 9, the Israel Defense Forces struck Doha, the capital of Qatar, killing five members of Hamas and one Qatari security officer. Israeli officials initially claimed the White House had signed off on the operation. The United States said it had been notified shortly before—not by Israel but by General Dan Caine, the chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. While President Donald Trump suggested the strike might ultimately “serve as an opportunity for peace,” he called it “unfortunate” and criticized it publicly: “Unilaterally bombing inside Qatar, a Sovereign Nation and close Ally of the United States, that is working very hard and bravely taking risks with us to broker Peace, does not advance Israel or America’s goals." The emir of Qatar was less ambivalent, calling it “an act of state terrorism.”

Although this wasn’t Israel’s first or last recent strike inside neighboring states, the Qatar hit was unprecedented. Unlike Iran, Qatar is a close partner of the U.S., hosting the largest American military base in the region.

Also unlike Iran, it has considerable sway in American politics. For years, the Qataris have been building out a powerful lobbying network in Washington. In May, they gave Trump a huge, ornate jumbo jet—a “palace in the sky,” per media commentary—supposedly worth US$400 million. They’re going into business with members of Trump’s family. And they’re cultivating relationships with right-wing influencers: The Qatari lobbying firm Lumen8 Advisors set up the interview the American political-media personality Tucker Carlson did with the prime minister of Qatar earlier this year.

What’s Qatar after here?

Nick Cleveland-Stout is a research associate in the Democratizing Foreign Policy program at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft and a co-author of the recent report “Soft Power, Hard Influence: How Qatar Became a Giant in Washington.” Cleveland-Stout says Qatar’s leadership has a strategy to develop its soft power internationally—and that strategy has two main parts: At home, they’re positioning Doha as a global capital of conflict mediation. And in the U.S., they’re buying as much influence as they possibly can. Which is a lot. No fewer than three of their former consultants and lobbyists have entered senior ranks in the Trump administration, one being the current head of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

What may be most striking, to Cleveland-Stout, is how reactive the Qataris’ U.S.-influence strategy is. They’re spending big in Washington mainly to ward off challenges from their regional rivals—above all, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Israel. All these countries have more entrenched lobbies in the U.S. capital; all of them pose a security threat to Qatar—which needs as much sway as it can get with the Americans on account of being so reliant on U.S. security guarantees. But the Israeli strike in Doha—that’s something new for the Qataris: an unprecedented test of how much all their spending can actually protect them when it matters …

Gustav Jönsson: Why were there Hamas negotiators in Qatar in September?