‘The Chernobyl parameter’

Today, Christopher Yeaw of the U.S. Department of State told the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva that “despite its claims to the contrary, China has deliberately and without constraint massively expanded its nuclear arsenal without transparency or any indication of China’s intent or end point.” Russia, moreover, has helped “boost Beijing’s capacity” to increase its stockpiles: “Beijing is on track to have the fissile material necessary for more than 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030.”

China countered that it’s not going to “engage in any nuclear arms race, with any country.”

But others might.

Russia is modernizing its nuclear weapons program, including major upgrades to its intercontinental ballistic missiles. And the U.S. is upgrading its own nuclear triad: The Congressional Budget Office estimates that modernizing and operating American nuclear capabilities will cost nearly US$1 trillion by 2034—excluding the costs of its new intercontinental ballistic missile program, Sentinel.

In September, Saudi Arabia announced a strategic mutual-defense pact with nuclear-armed Pakistan. In Europe, politicians have begun to speak openly about moving away from the U.S. nuclear umbrella. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, for example, has said he’s open to the idea of an independent European nuclear deterrent. And the Europeans have already taken some steps: in August, France and Germany said they would build a new European early-warning system.

Earlier this month, the New START treaty expired—the last remaining mutual limit on nuclear weapons between Russia and the United States. Speaking in Beijing, Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said, “This is a new moment, a new reality—we are ready for it.”

What are the risks in all this?

Serhii Plokhy is a professor of history at Harvard University and the author of The Nuclear Race: The Epic Race for Arms, Power and Survival , and David and Goliath: Commentaries on the Russo-Ukrainian War. Plokhy says the world has entered a second nuclear arms race—but a less orderly one. The last treaties on nuclear weapons have expired, leaving nuclear powers without the procedures and rules that once limited risks. And the risks are considerable: Russia has threatened to use tactical nuclear weapons, and it has already occupied Ukraine’s Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant. While people fear another Hiroshima, the more immediate danger may be another Chernobyl.

As the United States shifts its posture toward the rest of the world, countries in Europe and Asia have begun to reassess their own nuclear strategies. Pakistan’s pact with Saudi Arabia signals that smaller powers feel increasingly insecure. The Russia-Ukraine war, meanwhile, has shown Europe it can no longer rely on American security guarantees. So it’s clear these states will reconfigure their relationships—that’s already begun—but not yet clear at all how they’ll do it …

Gustav Jönsson: What states are reassessing their nuclear strategies—and how?

Serhii Plokhy: Francis Fukuyama published a book at the end of the Cold War with the phrase “The End of History” in the title. He predicted the victory of liberalism over alternative forms of governance. And to use—if not to abuse—this metaphor, I’d say we’re witnessing another end of history, but of a different kind: The period that started with the fall of the Berlin Wall has ended. We’re at a new turning point. It’s not that the nuclear age is back—the nuclear age never left us. But the nuclear arms race that had temporarily stopped is now back.

We can rely on the experience of the Cold War to figure out how to survive this new arms race. But it’s also different. As in the Cold War, two nuclear superpowers control more than 85 percent of total nuclear capacity. But now there are new players—China in particular. And the West no longer feels that it has won. The Cold War victory is crumbling, which encourages many other countries to reclaim what’s known as “great-power status.” Britain and France now view the U.S. as unreliable, so they’re trying to reclaim their own great-power status. China is already a great power and is now trying to become a superpower. And then there are countries in the Middle East seeking to claim the status of regional powers.

All of that’s happening within the context of the nuclear age. As these countries seek security, they’re more often than not upgrading their nuclear armaments—both the number of warheads and the means of delivery. We’re back to a sort of Cold War scenario, but with more players and less-defined rules. And there’s an atmosphere that encourages countries to either acquire nuclear weapons, build up their arsenals, or make alliances between nuclear and non-nuclear powers. It is pre–World War I but with nuclear weapons in the background.

Jönsson: Not very auspicious.

Plokhy: No.