Total ownership

The 2026 Spanish Supercopa final—between Barcelona and Real Madrid—didn’t take place in Spain. It took place at the King Abdullah Sports City Stadium, 30 kilometers north of Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Every Supercopa final has been held in Saudi since 2020—with one exception, when the Covid-19 pandemic forced the tournament back to Seville in 2021—as every one will be until at least 2029.

Meanwhile, the United Arab Emirates hosted the Asian Cup in 2019; Qatar did in 2024; Saudi Arabia will in 2027. That’s three Asian Cups in a row, in a corner of Asia that represents just over 7 percent of the continent’s total area—most of it desert—and 1 percent of its population.

Qatar held the World Cup in 2022; it’ll be Saudi in 2034.

The Gulf has poured money into football. Since 2008, its three wealthiest states have bought more than 20 clubs around the world—including three of the biggest in Europe: The United Arab Emirates owns Manchester City; Qatar, Paris Saint-Germain; and Saudi Arabia, Newcastle United.

We know this isn’t the first time ultra-wealthy interests have brought big money into the game—and transformed it. But these aren’t just ultra-wealthy interests. They’re ultra-wealthy governments. And they’re all dictatorships.

So what are they doing—and what do they want out of it?

Sarath K. Ganji is an analyst based in Washington, D.C., and the founding director of the Autocracy and Global Sports Initiative. Ganji notes that as the Gulf states have been buying their clubs, they’ve also been investing in sponsorship deals, media rights, and property developments—port infrastructure, too—all while the executives running these investments have taken positions inside football’s key governing bodies. And curious changes have followed—in what local politicians say, journalists write, even some artists end up doing …

From The Signal’s new limited-edition print extra, Shadow Play.

Gustav Jönsson: Why have these guys bought into England and France—and not, I don’t know, Mexico or Turkey?

Sarath K. Ganji: It goes back to August 1990, when Saddam Hussein’s Iraq invaded Kuwait. This was a traumatic experience for the Gulf states, particularly the smaller ones—Kuwait, obviously, but also Bahrain, the U.A.E., and Qatar—who were basically satellites to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. If, as it now seemed, none of their existing relationships could guarantee their security, they were going to have to look elsewhere. After the United States put together an international coalition and expelled Iraqi forces, the Gulf states saw that elsewhere—and started building ties with Washington.